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SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN UNITED STATES LAND
MASON GAFFNEY*

FOREIGN LAND PURCHASE AS AN
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL TRANSFER
Is foreign land purchase different from and less desirable than
other foreign investment?
Land is not produced. Land purchase does not therefore directly
create income as does investing in payroll to produce capital. Accordingly, the questions have been posed whether domestic land
purchase does not abort real investment and capital formation and
whether land purchase by foreigners does not abort the capital inflow of foreign investment.
In both cases the answer is "No, but. . ." Land purchase is simply
a transfer from buyer to seller; they swap situations without changing the aggregates. An economy is a closed system with a zero sum of
capital transfers. Money spent on land does not thereby leak out of
the flow of funds. There may be some slowdown, as cash reserves are
required to finance land transactions, but this is a continuing need
long since provided for. When sales turnovers rise and prices rise, cash
needs may rise, resulting in a net leakage. In these inflationary times,
however, this is not a major concern. Land in an active, rising market
becomes a much more liquid asset, more similar to cash; this tends to
satisfy certain motives for holding cash and reduce the need to hold
cash.
Anyone buying land is not directly employing domestic labor. He
is, however, freeing up the seller's funds. The seller may buy more
land, but land is fixed so there is always a net seller. Since the sum of
capital transfers is zero, we would only waste effort to track money
from seller to seller and speculate on what they all might do with
money. The market is a going concern, the inflow and outflow are
continual, and flows are simultaneous. We save trouble by looking
just at net changes.
A foreigner buying land makes available to the seller more real
money, money that claims real goods. Newly printed domestic
money is play money, mainly driving up prices. Foreign money is a
new claim on real foreign goods. The goods are transferred through a
*Graduate School of Administration, University of California at Riverside.
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well-oiled balance-of-payments mechanism to meet new demand
from new payrolls generated by the seller when he invests. The
mechanism clears out all the plus and minus of dealer and banker
buying and selling foreign exchange and leaves a net result: the seller
gets a claim on real foreign goods. Thus real capital moves to the
nation selling land. The nation trades land for capital, after all is
netted out. The effect is the same as a loan, secured by a mortgage
on the land. Like other loans, it may be used in different ways, and
the final effect depends on how it is used. The net effect is more real
capital at our disposal. However, absentee ownership affects how
land and capital are used.
Some uses of the imported capital will do more for national
income than others. The seller rather than the foreign land buyer
determines the use of the land. A foreigner investing directly in
payroll, on the other hand, determines exactly how the new capital is
used. If one believes that such use is superior, then it is comforting to
have the foreigner do it directly, for the domestic land seller might
import machinery instead. But it could also be the other way around,
so this is not an inherent fault of foreign land purchases.
Some uses of land do more for national income than others. A
foreign cartel buying a large industrial site simply to hold it from
competition, or for nebulous future expansion, removes the land
from the national economy as effectively as conquest. Yet the capital
is still transferred and goes to other domestic uses. Here, however,
underuse of land may offset the benefit of capital transfer by forcing
capital to be wasted in added infrastructure required to bypass the
idle land. Such infrastructure, with a low job-coefficient per dollar of
capital over time,1 is highly capital-intensive. But again, it could be
the other way around; the foreign buyer could convert waste land
into a hive of service and industry. The issue is one of land use, not
foreign purchase.
Foreigners bidding for land do help push up the price. Robert Solo
has written on how this discourages domestic saving and capital
formation. The reason is that land value substitutes for other assets
in the holdings of individuals and reduces need for them to create
real capital in order to have assets.' In addition, the dynamic rise of
values during the transition to higher levels creates current income.
Most current income is normally consumed and thus reduces saving.
1. This concept is developed and given precision in Gaffney, Full Employment with
Limited Land & Capital, in PROPERTY TAXATION, LAND USE AND PUBLIC POLICY
99 (A. Lynn ed. 1976); and in Gaffney, Full Employment and the Environment, in
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (G. Rohrlich ed. 1976).
2. Solo, The Accumulation of Wealth in the Form of Land-ownershipin Underdeveloped
Areas, LAND ECON. 156-60 (1955).
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Higher land prices resulting from foreign demand do not mean
that land is worth more to the nation, except as an exportable
commodity, which is a limited concept. Instead the same land is
capitalized at a lower rate, thus raising the price. This is a transfer of
wealth within the nation from non-owners to owners. There is no net
gain of national well-being. There is probably a loss if we accept the
idea that added wealth means less to those who have than those who
have not.
In any event there is no net gain, but there will appear to be one in
an inventory of national wealth because the gain shows and the loss
does not. To be sure, an inventory of national wealth will be deflated
by a price index, but note that land values do not appear, or are not
adequately weighted, in most commonly used price indices. Thus the
loss of young people's ability to buy land for business and home
building is underweighted, even though it creates a weighty problem
for them and society.
It is evident that in answering "No, but.. ." to the opening question, the "but" is as important as the "no." We now proceed to butt
these buts.
THE ADVANTAGES OF FOREIGN LAND PURCHASE
Capital Transfer
The foreign buyer acts to transfer capital to the selling nation during
the present capital shortage. A measure of the value of capital to a
nation is had by noting that the volume of throughput in a business
is the product of its capital times turnover. Likewise, the national
product is the national capital times its turnover. Of course we can
(and should) speed up turnover of that Great Revolving Fund, the
nation's capital. But it also helps to increase the Fund itself.
Stability of Transfer
Foreign capital in the form of "hot money" is a nervous and
uncertain addition to national wealth. A nation that lends long, like
the United States, and then borrows back short becomes vulnerable
to capital flights, which it must guard against at some cost. Foreign
land purchase is over at the other extreme from hot money and
minimizes this problem.
InternationalSpecialization
If we accept the idea that people and nations should specialize in
what they do best, and if we ignore whether land is different, then
foreigners with overflowing capital are better suited than needy
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citizens to finance land titles and carry the holding costs. They
simply have a comparative advantage in the function of holding land.
We accept domestic specialization of this kind, so why not international?
This raises the interesting question of what kind of function is
being performed by absentee land buyers. The individual landlord
relieves the individual tenant of a financing burden, but beware of the
fallacy of composition as we move from the parts to the whole. What
do landlords as a group do for tenants as a group? They bid up land
prices beyond their reach, without adding to the supply of land.
What would happen in their absence? Land prices would fall until
tenants became owner-operators.
Likewise, excluding foreign owners would serve mainly to facilitate resident-owner-occupancy of land by citizens. It seems there is
no meaningful gain of international specialization when absentees
hold land. The basic transfer of capital to the receiving nation is the
gain. Anything beyond that is double-counting. Absentee ownership
is in fact a frictional cost that offsets part of the gain.
Ideological Gains in World Debates
In the Marx-Lenin ideology, capitalistic imperialism results from
oversaving in the metropolitan nation and leads to a struggle among
foreign outlets to capture surplus goods and capital The image has
been created of capitalist centers always long on capital and desperate to dispose of it. United States tax favors stimulating offshore
investment and a host of allied policies have done much to reinforce
this tenet of ideology around the world. As a result foreign nations
regard United States capital with economic contempt and political
fear. This whole image and its dependent ideological apparatus are
refuted and shattered by the spectacle of a dominant capitalist
nation acknowledging its need to import foreign capital. The result
would be more respectful treatment of United States investors by
foreign host nations in thought, in word, and in deed.
Similarly, for a net creditor nation to reject foreign investors
would be glaringly inconsistent with its major national intent and
posture. Such action would invite both ridicule and retaliation. The
nation must welcome foreign money to legitimize its own actions. It
has much more to lose than gain from a world spiral of hostility to
foreign investors.
Disintermediation
Foreign land purchase is direct investment that transfers capital
without it necessarily going through financial intermediaries. Some
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of it does anyway, to be sure, in order to secure needed advisory,
services. The gain is that those not needing the services can avoid
buying them. This spares the institutions the real costs of providing
the unwanted services and creates net social gain.
This brings foreign management directly into the host country by
requiring them to devote time and talent for managing the newly
purchased business. There are several advantages.
The first advantage is at the local fiscal level. Industry usually
generates net fiscal gains to cities, while residences do the opposite.
An industry located here but in part managed there means added tax
base without commensurate added costs, especially for schools. What
this means for local jobs is something else to be considered later. The
nation's income tax base is also reduced because foreign headquarters
personnel are not taxed in the host country even though the company's tax liability is reduced by its being charged or overcharged for
management services from the home office. Thus profit is shifted
upstairs out of the host country. Nonetheless, the locality may reap a
gain.
The second and more substantial advantage is that foreign management may invade local cartels and restricted markets. Outsiders
are less likely to be members of organizations that restrain trade and
competition. New management has it less to lose and more to gain by
breaking things up. Even in the absence of actual conspiracies to
restrain trade there is always the implicit conspiracy of the quiet life
by mutual tacit consent. Foreigners introduce new ideas, techniques,
and products. Equally important, they may introduce habitual
winners to the new humiliation of coming in second, just as they do
in Olympic athletic events, and thereby inspire more effort.
Obviating Police Costs
Foreign land purchase obviates the high police costs of trying to
prevent it. Even defining it poses mind-bending riddles. When a
national moves abroad, is he now a foreign owner? What arbitrary
rule should we use to say when he must sell out, and why is one rule
better than another? -What if a foreigner buys shares in a native
corporation holding land? At what point does a multi-national corporation chartered at home become an alien, as its shares sell around
the world, its ships carry Panamanian registry, and its assets are
everywhere? What about straw owners and front men, street names
and blind trusts? What about land contracts, who is the true owner?
What about estates? The problem of the United States Land Office
trying to enforce residence requirements under the Homestead Act
and the United States Bureau of Reclamation trying to enforce its
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anti-speculation 160-acre law should serve to alert us to the high
police cost and the low success ratio attending efforts to exclude
wealthy buyers from choice markets.
There are useful spin-offs. The Bureau has gathered interesting
data on the high concentration of ownership its policies failed to
counteract, and if these figures were distributed and publicized
beyond the present narrow circle of specialized researchers they
could be of some public benefit. Information about who owns how
much of the nation's land would be a major input into current policy
debates on such issues as the incidence of property taxation. The
benefit of this information seems too indirect to be a major rationale
for discriminating against alien landowners.
THE DISADVANTAGES OF FOREIGN LAND PURCHASE

Less Intensive Use
There are several studies of absenteee landownership. 3 Perhaps the
most thorough was in the United States Census of Agriculture for
1900, in itself testimony to the need for more current information,
for surely thy topic is of greater national importance than details
about personal plumbing and equally consequential matters actually
recorded currently. The findings of the 1900 study are worth citing
because they show such a systematic pattern. Size of farm increased
systematically with the distance between owner and farm, foreign
owners having the largest farms by far.4 At the same time intensity
of use declined with size of farm, a trend still evident today.
There are several a priori grounds for expecting foreign owners of
land to use it less intensively. One is the "security" motive often
expressed by wealthy foreign buyers hedging their bets and diversifying to guard against political reverses at home. Buyers so motivated seek investments whose value is high relative to the management factor. Management needs vary with volume of production and
sales.
3. Turner, Absentee Farmn Ownership in the United States, 3 J. LAND & PUB' UTIL.
ECON. 50-51 (1927); Stokdyk, CorporationFarms, in KAN. ST. BOARD OF AGRICULTURE, 27TH BIENNIAL REPORT 81 (1929-30); S. LIVERMORE, EARLY AMERICAN
LAND COMPANIES (1939); P. GATES, FRONTIER LANDLORDS AND PIONEER
TENANTS (1945); Gray, Land Speculation in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SERVICES (E. Seligman ed. 1931); R. BILLINGTON, WESTWARD EXPANSION (1949); M.
HARRIS, ORIGIN OF THE LAND TENURE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1953);
A. POLl & R. NIELSEN NON-RESIDENT LANDOWNERS OF IMPERIAL VALLEY,
CALIFORNIA (Bureau of Agricultural Eecon., U.S. Dep't. of Agriculture 1942); U.S.
BUREAU OF CORP., DEP'T COM. & LAB., THE LUMBER INDUSTRY, pts. 1-4 (1913);
B. HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES, ch. 12 (1924).
4. UNITED STATES CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, 1900, No. 1, Part 1, at xc.
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There was a time when portfolio investments helped meet this
need, but that time is largely past due to inflation and tax policies
that favor direct over portfolio investment. Common stock ownership is another way, but many shareholders suffer from the inevitable
conflict between ownership and management. These shareholders
prefer to hold their own and thereby minimize the management
input.
It is the surplus yielded by land that attracts remote investors.
Marginal increments to intensity by definition yield little surplus
above cost. Real estate analysts refer therefore to the top stories of
tall buildings as increments of "low quality." Labor at the intensive
margin likewise is a "low quality" risk to the absentee investor hiring
labor while paying a percentage to a hired manager. In contrast
marginal labor may be the livelihood of the owner-operator, who
therefore will probe deeper into the intensive margin of use than the
absentee owner.
An aspect of land use where absentee owners are weakest is conservation and maintenance where investments often are of "low
quality" and separation of owner and manager is particularly
damaging. Accordingly, foreign owners are strongly attracted to
mining where the surplus is often large, waiting is long and costly,
and conservation least involved. Mining is by nature destructive and
migratory rather than conserving.
The kind of "conservation" to expect from foreign mine owners is
the holding action of a cartel calculated to sustain prices. But this,
like mining without adequate labor to finish up a good clean job, is
the opposite of intensive use.
Weaker Political Control
For several reasons landownership is more political than ownership
of other things. Landholders originated in history as vassals of a king
who delegated to them some of his sovereign powers. If history
weren't enough, the very nature of an owner's dominion over part of
the national estate is an expression of territorial power, the same
power the nation claims to exclude the world. Something of national
sovereignty is lost when aliens join the ranks of landholders. The
"king's vassals" serve two masters.
The United States' "Trading with the Enemy" Act is an extension
of sovereignty. Imagine having much of our land held and administered by people subject and responsive to foreign laws yet invested
by our laws with privileges and power denied to landless citizens. The
United States regularly uses foreign offices of'home-based firms as
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cover for intelligence agents. The United States has sometimes sent
the Marines to protect the rights of its citizens holding land abroad,
and the occasional deed is the continual threat. The idea that
national defense is a public good from which all benefit equally
betrays a general unawareness of how much military and diplomatic
effort is dedicated to enhancing the position of citizens holding
interests in land offshore.' Landholders are subject to the sovereign
police power; foreign landholdings have even been used for troop
staging. Yet larger landholdings are less subject to the police power
than small. They often have their own police.
Another origin of landownership is foreign conquest. Many vestigial aspects of the common law make landholders higher-class
citizens than the landless. Until very recently only landowners had
standing in court in an environmental case, even though the owner
was an absentee whose lessee's interest was being injured. Property
qualifications for the vote have been largely removed, yet in some
special improvement districts only landowners can vote, even though
these districts have borrowed the sovereign power of taxation. Many
important local details of administering farm price support laws and
allocation of quotas have been delegated to committees of local landowners. Tax exemption granted to churches goes to their real estate,
not clergymens' incomes, and churches renting their premises do not
benefit.
Land income is taxed at much lower effective rates than wage and
salary income under federal and state tax laws. Some loopholes are
so gross as to constitute negative tax rates.6 Foreign land purchase
raises the question whether we want the income of aliens operating
in the nation treated more favorably than the income of citizens.
A good deal of land value is a political value. Alfred Marshall, the
definitive Victorian economist, called it the "public value of land" in
reference to its political sources. Government establishes a sovereign
claim over territory initially by driving away rivals and enemies and
continues keeping them at bay. It parcels out land to individuals, and
all claims of title hark back to some originating sovereign whose
successor is our present sovereign government. Government provides
police to enforce the tenures so granted (imagine collecting rent in
Harlem without them) and lets larger landholders have their own
police. Government finances or regulates site-specific public works
5. The writer has documented this theme in M. Gaffney, The Benefits of Military Spending (unpublished manuscript 1972).
6. The writer has laid out the details in The Treatment of Land Income, Hearings on
Economic Analysis and the Efficiency of Government, Before Joint Econ. Comm., pt. 2,
405-15 (1969).
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that make and break land values. Accordingly, landholders generally
take an active interest in politics and wield influence out of proportion to their numbers.
Local government, particularly, is responsive to landholders who
often view it as their own "cooperative," a kind of business whose
main function is to serve them. This view is implied in the common
slogan "Property should pay for services to property, not to people,"
a modern expression of the contract theory of the state. This leaves
central government to serve people from taxes on people but not
until the central revenues derived from taxing people are shared with
local governments to help serve property and relieve its tax burdens.
Local governments then enjoy a delegation of the sovereign police
power by having control over zoning, which they use largely to
exclude citizens of little wealth. Thus an alien landowner is invested
indirectly with delegated sovereign powers used to keep landless
citizens away from choice lands. As land values rise, in part from
such political acts, landholders receive an "unearned increment."
Economists have identified this income as serving little useful
economic function. Private enjoyment of it is easier to defend on
political grounds. Landholders are a political caste who provide
needed social and public leadership. The Founding Fathers, the
Virginia dynasty, the English "squirearchy," and the German Junkers
all seem to provide successful examples; the French and Russian
aristocracies along with the padrones of Latin America and zamindars of India were less successful. T. S. Ashton, Alexis de Toqueville, and many other social commentators have rationalized landowner income in this way.
This rationale is lost, however, when aliens buy in and replace
native owners. Then ownership loses everything but its purely commercial character, and as such it lacks enough function to justify
receipt of unearned income. Society is pluralistic, held together by
many value systems. We can live with anomalies, tip to a point. Alien
assumption of landowner prerogatives whose origins were premised
on compensating public service and leadership pushes us right to the
limit.
Weaker Social Control
Foreign owners are less concerned with local external economies
and diseconomies, both technological and pecuniary, resulting from
their management. Thus a branch plant controlled abroad may be
put on and off standby, imposing all the costs of instability on the
host economy in order to stabilize the home economy. When output
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is prorated the branch plant may get less than its share, due to
political and economic pressure exerted at home. Owners will transfer both jobs and profits to the jurisdiction where they most need
political support.
As to the physical environment, the absentee owner is obviously
less affected, aware, and concerned than the resident owner. As to
the social and civic environment, the absentee contributes little, as
may be observed in slum neighborhoods. Jon Udell has impressively
demonstrated the dereliction of absentee owners and branch plant
managers in local charities, philanthropies, and other civic good
works. 7 The effect of such dereliction on the character of young
people growing up is simply incalculable.
Monopoly Control of Public Lands
Managers of public lands sometimes are forced to deal with one
buyer whose private land holds a strategic spot. When the buyer
becomes an alien the interesting question arises whether public
policy is served by letting timber, for example, be sold on subcompetitive terms. Public managers have at times evinced a weakness
for favoring their clients. In the Tongass National Forest of Alaska,
for example, the monopsony buyers are now Japanese. 8
Violation of Native Mores
Alien landowners intrude on a local scene in a dominant social
role. They will have different ideas about race relations. They know
different customs about toleration of trespass by hunters, fishers,
and sojourners. They deal differently with employees and tenants,
both relations being subject to extensive social control by custom
and tradition. They have different ideas about the responsibilities as
between neighbors, the proper public face of private property, and
the care of the environment. Landownership has a sociological,
political, and economic aspect, and alien intrusion is bound to be an
irritant.
Loss of Tax Base
The law distinguishes taxes in rem, on things, and in personam, on
persons. Real estate taxes are in rem and express the sovereign's
underlying ownership of land in a nation. The thing, not the owner,
is liable to seizure and forfeit for non-payment. The personal cir7. J. UDELL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE MERGER
MOVEMENT IN WISCONSIN (1969).
8. U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., NAT'L TECH. INFORMATION SERVICE, 2 FEDERAL
LAND LAWS AND POLICIES IN ALASKA, Code PB 195-295-LK (1974).
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cumstances, location, and citizenship of the owner are immaterial.
Taxes in rem are not lost when aliens buy. Taxes in personam are
another matter. An alien owner may shift taxable profit to his home
jurisdiction by adjusting transfer prices internal to his firm or corporation and by allocating overhead and other invisible service costs
to the land in the host country. At the same time the alien owner
imposes no personal service costs on the host nation, like educating
his children. However, if large holdings are involved per owner, this
gain is small when compared to the potential losses. We will see that
foreign holdings do average larger than native ones.
There are other taxes that miss alien owners. Consumption and
death taxes, and payroll taxes on home-office managment staff,
whose services are imported without their bodies, are obvious examples. The foreign buyer seeking (primarily) security will avoid
marginal increments of land improvement in the "low-quality" stage
of intensification where there is little surplus above real costs. But all
these increments would have been taxable, as would have been the
added gross activity they could shelter. Land used less intensively
yields less taxes.
But what then happens to the net inflow of foreign capital from
the land purchases? Much of it leaks now into public infrastructure
tax free. Even disregarding taxes, there is a tradition of using low
interest rates for planning, sizing, timing, and extending public
works. The net result is triply inferior: the capital yields no taxes; its
marginal productivity is below par; and its turnover is slow, reducing
all the payroll and taxable activity associated with recovering and
reinvesting capital.
Long Term Drains
When a foreigner buys land there is a real capital transfer in the
United States. But then begin the return flows of income. If he buys
at a capitalization rate of 10%, or "ten years' purchase," in ten years
the return outflows equal the original inflow and then go on forever.
On the plus side, we keep the capital transfer forever, and capital can
yield real income. Good are transitory, unlike land, but "Capital is
kept in existence from age to age, not by preservation but by continual reproduction." 9 Each turnover poses a risk of loss, it is true,
but added returns on successful ventures yield risk premia to compensate. The foreign exchange problem solves itself. Added production from the new capital increases our exports and reduces our
imports and thereby cover the rent outflow. Yet we observe nations
9. J. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 47 (1872).
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badly exploited by foreign landholders. This occurs when they sell
too cheap and handle their new capital badly. It is an old familiar
story that occurs where non-commercial cultures with high timepreference and short time-horizons come in contact with sharp
lenders laden with money, equipped with guile, and backed by their
nation's armed forces. Aramco, for example, originated in 1933 with
a capital of $100,000.'" In 1956 it netted $280 million after all
taxes and royalties.' 1 Few others have matched that success story,
but it suggests the possibilities.
A powerful nation of modern, businesslike people has less to fear
in this regard. We do not trifle away foreign loans on big funerals and
weddings like the Indian peasants who fall in the grip of usurious
money-lenders. We will not be invaded by Swiss or Belgian Marines.
We will not sell Manhattan island for beads and trinkets. However we
do have our own sacred cows which can lead us into deep trouble.
We do not waste capital in the childlike ways of primitive peoples.
We waste it in our own mature, sophisticated ways. We slush precious
capital into highways well beyond our needs. We pad the Pentagon
budget with work-relief items and put our hope in their "ripple
effects." We carry an increment of water supply to southern California at many times the necessary capital cost. One could go on and
on. The waste does every day.
There is a rationale that the social rate of time-preference is lower
than the private rate. What that means in practice is that governmental agencies may invest capital at extremely low productivity,
especially in public works of long life and slow results. Now if the
foreigner buys our land for a 10% return and we invest marginal
public capital for a 2% return, then we are the losers and we are in
trouble. If we invest the public capital to enhance the income of the
land the foreigner has bought, we compound the error. If now we
turn and blame the foreigner for our own mistakes, we are childlike,
irresponsible, and incorrigible indeed.
There is also the question of secondary effects. If the primary
effects are negative, so are the net secondary effects. When foreign
capital flows in it finances local income payments, and these in turn
create new opportunities in the area impacted. Some of the new
opportunities yield net surpluses over cost, or rents, and there are net
gains to the receiving nation, unless the benefitting lands are foreign10. The Great Oil Deals, FORTUNE 175 (1947) (cited in R. MIKESELL & H
CHENERY, ARABIAN OIL 55-56 n. 31 (1949)).
11. Emergency Oil Lift and Related Oil Problems: Joint Hearing Before Subcomm. o.
Sen. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) (testimony of F
A. Davies) (cited in R. ENGLER, THE POLITICS OF OIL 224 (1961)).
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owned. When rents flow back, however, the secondary gains go with
them. Swiss residents living off American rents increase the demand
for homesites in Switzerland and for ski resorts and commercial land,
adding to Swiss rents, and detracting from American. Meanwhile the
American condition depends on what Americans did with their
earlier secondary gains. If these were simply consumed away, there is
another net loss over time.
Concentrationof Ownership
Absentee landholdings are larger on the average than resident
holdings of land. "While the portfolio foreign investments of the
1920's were held by a large number of individuals and corporations,
direct investments have always been heavily concentrated in the
hands of relatively few American companies with foreign branches
and subsidiaries."' ' 2 There is an overwhelming weight of evidence
supporting this generalization in every field of direct investment., 3
Opening the door to foreign investors, therefore, opens a field
dominated by the largest firms and wealthiest individuals.
DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS AND THE BALANCE OF ADVANTAGE
When foreigners want to buy our land there are great disadvantages in trying to exclude them and great disadvantages in admitting
them. What to do? The answer lies in finding filters that will secure
the good effects while sparing us the bad.
The problem arises in part from our having let the rights of
property rise in value relative to the rights of citizenship as such, the
latter being what a landless orphan, who is what many a slum youth
is, might come into as he matures. What he comes into now is a world
where services to people are increasingly financed by taxes on
people's wages and consumption, and services to property are partly
financed by these same wages and consumption; a world where payroll taxes on the young will rise to cover pensions for the old; a
world where land for new homes and businesses is beyond his reach.
Unless he is Ph.D. material his better bargains are a car, a TV, a
welfare card and a gun. Only the gun promises to enrich him enough
to compete with aliens for his native land. Even the Ph.D. may not
get him a job.
12. THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE ASSOCIATION, INC., AMERICAN PRIVATE
ENTERPRISE, FOREIGN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND THE AID PROGRAMS 2

(1957).
13. R. MIKESELL, PROMOTING UNITED STATES PRIVATE INVESTMENT
ABROAD 23 (1957); U.S. DEP'T OF COM., UNITED STATES BUSINESS INVESTMENTS
IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES 144 (1960); 19 INT'L FINANCIAL NEWS SURVEY 73
(1967); C. LAYTON, TRANS-ATLANTIC INVESTMENT 18 (1966).
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A useful filter to counteract such problems is the property tax.
Property taxes do not exclude foreign buyers or require any special
policing. They do however reserve a piece of the "bundle of rights"
to be used for services to citizens and residents that is not transferred
with the fee simple title. A community that taxes property receives
the benefit of foreign ownership without as much damage. The
higher the tax rate, the larger the reservation of community rights.
The property tax turns land to the greater benefit of our "landless
orphan" citizen in two ways beyond simply raising money. Most
taxes are activity-based: they shoot anything that moves and spare
what doesn't. Property taxes are the opposite; they are passivitybased, and so apply leverage to property. The incentive effects are
positive. Land-based taxes induce owners to turn land to heavy use
to raise tax money. Very intensive use of farm land in the Wright Act
Irrigation Districts of California has clearly developed as a response
to heavy land taxes levied to finance water supplies and break up
large landholdings. 1 4 Use of land means service to consumers and
jobs for workers. Thus the landless citizen benefits triply, as a taxpayer, a consumer, and a worker.
The land, by the same token, is made less attractive to those
foreigners who seek a quietly secure, appreciating asset they can hold
at a distance without much management input. It is the surplus in
property that attracts investors. Property taxes cut right at the heart
of the surplus, without reducing the return on "low-quality" intensifying increments of labor. The comparative advantage of the intensive user rises; the filter is doing its job.
Property taxation filters out foreign buyers who, in seeking security without offering enterprise, would hold back our land from full
economic use. This is more true of the land element of the tax. The
building tax, on the other hand, adds to the cost of holding capital
and screens out marginal "low-quality" investment increments. But
neither element is a tax that "shoots anything that moves." Both
elements spare motion and aim at torpidity, because the taxable
event on which they are based is not action but the passage of time.
By discouraging absentee ownership, property taxes preclude
impairment of sovereignty. In addition, property taxes are an annual
reminder and assertion of sovereignty over land, a psychological as
well as financial effect. They require inspection and appraisal. They
tend to break up large holdings, increasing interdependency and
exchange, which in turn pass through public rights-of-way and
14. Henley, Land Value Taxation by California Irrigation Districts, in LAND AND
BUILDING TAXES 137 (A. Becker ed. 1969).
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markets to be observed and policed. They are no answer to all
foreign arrogations, but they forestall developing weakness that
would encourage violations of sovereignty.
By discouraging passive absentee owners, property taxes, especially their land element, bring owners nearer to their land, making
them more aware of its environment and their civic duties, and by
subjecting the owner more to local social controls, we raise the
danger of subjecting him to local networks in restraint of trade.
However, the more intensive use of land is ipso facto a freeing of
restraint, necessarily leading to greater volume, lower prices and
greater job opportunities. The application of labor to property tends
to be regressive; larger holdings are much less heavily manned. Peter
Dorner, Don Kanel," s John Riew,'6 Morton Paglin,"7 Albert
Berry,' ' and others have documented the point beyond much doubt.
Property taxes therefore have always tended to break up large concentrations of property, thereby fostering subdivision, intensification, equal distribution, and competition.
The in rem character of property taxes is an advantage. They fall
due each year on aliens as well as residents, regardless of address.
They are unavoidable by shifting profits abroad, by consuming,
working, or dying abroad. They require no international agreements
or bargains, treaties, or concessions. No one needs to hunt down the
absent owner; he pays or he forfeits his real estate.
Another advantage is cutting down our need of foreign capital by
reducing the required capital coefficients of each job. Taxes on
capital make it cost more relative to labor and discourage the substitution of capital for labor. I count this as a lesser advantage. The
greater saving is the saving of infrastructure capital achieved when
land taxation raises the density of settlement and land use. This is
why California Irrigation Districts taxed land, and their experience is
symbolic of what the whole economy needs: heavier use of land
under the ditch and fewer ditches.
Favors to Americans investing abroad are also in need of review. It
is altogether anomalous to subsidize capital export, as this nation
does, and then sell the homeland to foreigners. America outre-mer
has a GNP well over $100 billion, making it the third or fourth
15. Dorner & Kanel, The Economic Case for Land Reform, in LAND REFORM IN
LATIN AMERICA 39 (P. Dorner ed. 1971).
16. Riew, Assigning Collection of a Statewide Uniform Rate Land Tax, in PROPERTY
TAXATION AND THE FINANCE OF EDUCATION (R. Lindholm ed. 1974).
17. Paglin, Surplus Agricultural Labor and Development, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 815
(1965).
18. Berry, Presumptive Income Tax on Agricultural Land: The Case of Columbia, 25
NAT'L TAX J. 169 (1972).
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largest economy in the world.' I It is not a labor-intensive GNP but
rather capital and resource-intensive. There is a prodigious fund of
real wealth that might be summoned home simply by repealing the
various special privileges America outre-mer enjoys, like the foreign
tax credit and deferred taxation of unrepatriated income.2 0 If native
and alien owners both stayed closer to their own homes, the net
change would be the reduction of absentee ownership with its heavy
personal and social costs.
In summary, we have made these points. Foreign purchase of
domestic land effects an international capital transfer, just as though
the foreigner loaned us money or shipped goods here. There are
several advantages to the host nation: it gives foreign nations a stake
in our welfare; it causes foreign nations to treat our overseas capital
more respectfully; it may bypass unneeded financial middlemen; it
may bring in creative new management; and it obviates the high costs
of any effort to prevent it.
There are also disadvantages to the host. Absentee owners use land
less productively, necessitating some waste of the new capital in
stretched-out transportation and utility lines and other infrastructure
costs that increase as functions of space and distance. Landholding is
politically sensitive and holders are powerful, so alien ownership
threatens native sovereignty. Absentee owners are less useful civic
leaders and less sensitive to the local physical and social, political and
economic environment. Land income receives preferential treatment
under the income tax. Much of it is unearned so there is no gain in
taxing foreign owners more favorably than citizen labor. Foreign
owners may secure monopsony control over use of the public
domain. Foreign owners may violate local custom, dealing from
strength. Foreign owners may avoid most kinds of taxes, operating
from privileged sanctuaries. Foreign purchase tends to increase concentration of ownership. Finally, the host nation may waste its new
capital in low-yield investments while paying income to aliens at
market rates, falling into the grip of the money lender.
The balance of advantage depends on domestic institutions. This
writer suggests we make heavier use of property taxation, particularly the land element, in order to filter out aliens who would
scorch our earth by underutilization, and filter in those who would
activate land, serve consumers, and hire workers. He suggests that the
19. Model, The Politics of Private Foreign Investment, 45 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 640-41
(1967).
20. L. KRAUSE & K. DAM, FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INCOME
(1964); P. RICHMAN, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME (1963); S.
SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 183-84 (1973).
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rights of citizenship should take priority over the rights of property
and that property should be taxed to provide services to people,
rather than the reverse. He suggests we stop wasting capital in public
works of low productivity which make us depend on foreign capital;
and that we summon home a portion of the native capital now
enjoying tax shelter offshore. These measures would constitute an
effective response to the challenge of foreigners who would buy our
land.

